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)
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)
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Christopher Lee Brown asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 770 (Ct. App. Nov. 26,
2013) (hereinafter, Opinion).

He submits that the Opinion, which reversed the district

court's order granting Mr. Brown's motion to suppress, was in error because the Court
of Appeals erroneously determined that the trial court's finding of when the reason for
the stop was over was a conclusion of law, and further erred in holding that it was
unsupported by any evidence. Thus the Court erred by holding that it was "unable to

1

find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's] conclusion of law that the
purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Brown's van." 1
(Opinion, p.6.)

As a result of these errors, Mr. Brown submits that the Opinion, was in

conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and Idaho Court of
Appeals. Mr. Brown respectfully submits that, when viewed in context of the trial court's
entire findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is apparent that the trial court was
following the proper legal standards and had made a factual finding that was based on
evidence contained in the record, namely that the officer had testified as to the order of
his investigation at the hearing-that he first talked to Mr. Brown about the plastic
covering his rear window, then he requested the driver's license and registration, which
he then ran through the computer, before returning to Mr. Brown's vehicle to ask
consent to search. Thus the district court's factual finding that the purpose of the stop
had concluded after the officer ran the information through the computer was supported
by substantial evidence in the record, and the Court of Appeals erred both in holding
that the point at which the purpose of the stop ended was a conclusion of law, and in
finding that the officer intended to give Mr. Brown an additional warning.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Christopher Brown was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver based upon evidence found during a search of Mr. Brown's vehicle. (R., p.12.)
The State's charge was the result of a traffic stop that allegedly uncovered a quantity of
marijuana and various items of drug paraphernalia, including a scale and plastic

1

Conversely, there was no evidence in the record to support the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the officer returning to
Mr. Brown's van.

2

baggies.

(R., pp.11-12.)

Thereafter, Mr. Brown moved to suppress the evidence,

arguing, in part, that he was seized in violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment, and the evidence gathered against him should be suppressed as fruits of
his unlawful seizure. (R., pp.38-39.) As additional testimony was deemed necessary
before a written memorandum in support of Mr. Brown's motion to suppress could
feasibly be prepared, the district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress at
which Officer Cwik testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the seizure and
arrest of Mr. Brown.

(See generally, 4/30/12 Tr.)

district court set a briefing schedule for the parties.

After hearing the testimony, the
(4/30/12 Tr., p.41, L.24 - p.43,

L.11.)
In his memorandum in support of this motion, Mr. Brown raised two challenges to
his detention and the search of his vehicle. 2 First, Mr. Brown asserted that the officer
lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal wrongdoing at
the time of the stop. (R., pp.65-68.) Second, Mr. Brown asserted that any consent to
search, if consent was given at all, was constitutionally invalid.

(R., pp.68-71.) The

district court granted the motion to suppress and made oral findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 3 (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-7; R., pp.74-75.) The relevant findings of
fact and conclusions of law are as follows:
1. On January 27, 2012, near midnight, Officer Cwik observed a vehicle in
the Hastings parking lot, which is in Coeur d'Alene just north of Appleway.

Mr. Brown also raised as an issue whether his cell phone could be searched without a
warrant; however, the district court did not rule on or otherwise address this issue in its
oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R., p.72.) Respondent reserves the right
to re-raise this issue in the event that the district court's order suppressing the evidence
is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court.
3 The district court announced that its oral pronouncement constituted its findings of fact
and conclusions of law that supported its decision. (5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.4-7.)
2

3

The officer saw a particular van that was missing its rear window. It had a
plastic covering over the window. The van was idling, and the officer
observed that he could not see through the plastic covering in the rear
window and determined that that was a violation of state traffic laws.
2. Officer Cwik testified that he watched the vehicle for approximately ten
minutes and then saw the vehicle leave the parking lot and drive in what
the officer determined to be a somewhat erratic or eccentric manner. That
is, the route the vehicle drove when it left the parking lot in a westbound
fashion than turned north on Government Way. It turned east on Anton,
which is the very next street up. It turned south on Fourth Street, which
was the very next street it could come to. It turned west on Appleway
again. It turned north on Government Way again. Essentially, the vehicle
went in a circle around the big block, until the officer stopped the vehicle in
the parking lot of a business off of Government Way.
3. Officer Cwik testified that he spoke with the driver and obtained the
driver's license, registration and insurance from Mr. Brown. He ran the
information regarding the driver of the vehicle through the Coeur d'Alene
police computer system to find out if there were any wants or warrants out
for Mr. Brown and to check the status of his driver's license.
4. Officer Cwik asked Mr. Brown to explain the driving pattern, and
Mr. Brown explained that he lives on Anton, but was distracted by talking
to a friend, presumably on the telephone. This was not a very satisfying
explanation.
5.
Officer Cwik also testified that he had obtained information about
drugs being sold from a vehicle in that location fitting the description of
Mr. Brown's vehicle. There was no more specificity provided other than
that generalized understanding by Officer Cwik.
6. Based on a review of the videotape, Officer Cwik received an envelope
from the driver that presumably contained Mr. Brown's registration, license
and insurance information. The officer then left Mr. Brown still seated in
the vehicle and returned to his patrol car with the envelope.
7. After Officer Cwik determined that there were no wants or warrants out
for Mr. Brown, he asked Mr. Brown if he would consent to a search of his
vehicle. Mr. Brown consented to the search. Mr. Brown's driver's license
was not returned to him at the time that he was asked and granted
consent to search the vehicle. Officer Cwik spoke to Mr. Brown for about
30 seconds before Mr. Brown exited the vehicle and Officer Cwik began to
search.
8. During a search of the vehicle, Officer Cwik found marijuana.
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9. There was a reasonable basis for Officer Cwik to stop the vehicle.
There was reasonable and articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction
was occurring; specifically being the plastic that was not able to be seen
through on the rear window-that was the basis for a traffic stop.
10. The reason for the traffic stop-the covered up rear window-was
over at the time that the officer returned to contact with Mr. Brown, and
that the traffic stop was then extended.
11. Mr. Brown was not free to go. Mr. Brown did not have his driver's
license in hand or his registration or his insurance, and the traffic stop was
extended for no articulable reason other than for the officer to ask for
consent to search the vehicle.
12. The Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho
647 (Ct. App. 2002) is instructive in that an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop. "An individual may not be detained, even momentarily, without
reasonable objective grounds for so doing. A consent to search given
during an illegal detention is tainted by the illegality and therefore is an
ineffective consent." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
13. Because Officer Cwik kept a hold of the driver's license and
registration and insurance, beyond what was necessary for dealing with
the covered up window in the back, such constituted an unlawful and
illegal extension of Mr. Brown's detention, which rendered ineffective the
consent Mr. Brown gave to Officer Cwik.
14. There was no valid consent and anything found in Mr. Brown's vehicle
would be suppressed.
15. Based on a review of the video, the consent for search was requested
and granted without the information being handed back to Mr. Brown-he
was not free to go and therefore his detention was extended without a
reasonable basis to do so.
(5/24/12 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.13, L.8.)
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The district court found, based on the testimony of the investigating officer and a
review of the video of the stop, 4 that the consent to search was invalid, as the
investigating officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop of Mr. Brown for no articulable
reason other than the officer asking Mr. Brown for consent to search his vehicle.
(5/24/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-2, p.10, Ls.16-18.)

The district court found that Mr. Brown's

consent to search was given during an illegally extended detention and was therefore
tainted by the illegality, rendering it an ineffective consent, and ordered the evidence
suppressed. (5/24/12 Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.1; R., pp.75, 78.)
The State appealed. (R., pp.80-82).
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, finding that
Mr. Brown's consent to search was valid because the stop was not irnperrnissibly
extended.

(Opinion, p.4.) The Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the stop

continued when the officer asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. (Opinion, p.6.) The
Court noted that the officer had not returned Mr. Brown's license or registration, had not
given Mr. Brown the warning regarding the rear window, and the officer reasonably
wanted to inquire about Brown's driving pattern. (Opinion, p.6.) Thus the Court was
"unable to find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's] conclusion of
law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Brown's
van." 5 (Opinion, p.6.)

No audio recording of the traffic stop was available-Officer Cwik was not aware that
his audio recorder had malfunctioned until the morning of the suppression hearing.

4

~4/30/12 Tr., p.24, L.14 - p.25, L.3.)

However, there was no evidence in the record to support the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the officer returning to
Mr. Brown's van.
6

Stated another way, the Court of Appeals found that the issue of when the stop
ended was a conclusion of law, and that conclusion of law by the district court was not
supported by any facts in the record. (Opinion, p.6 (emphasis added).)
Mr. Brown timely filed a Petition for Review.

7

ISSUE
Should this Court grant Mr. Brown's petition for review, and affirm the district court's
order granting his motion to suppress, where the district court's findings of fact
regarding Mr. Brown's suppression motion were amply supported by the record and the
district court correctly applied the legal standards in granting this motion?

8

ARGUMENT
This Court Should Grant Mr. Brown's Petition For Review, And Affirm The District
Court's Order Granting His Motion To Suppress, Where The District Court's Findings Of
Fact Regarding Mr. Brown's Suppression Motion Were Amply Supported By The
Record And The District Court Correctly Applied The Legal Standards In Granting This
Motion
A.

Introduction
Mr. Brown submits that the Idaho Court of Appeals incorrectly found that there

was no evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion as to when the
reason for the traffic stop ended. Mr. Brown further submits that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the district court's conclusion as to when the reason for the traffic
stop ended was a conclusion of law. Mr. Brown submits that, rather than speculating
that, after he asked consent to search, the officer would resume talking to Mr. Brown
about the plastic covered rear window and eventually issue him a written warning, the
district court properly evaluated the facts and evidence in the record and found that the
reason for the stop was over at the time that the officer returned to contact with
Mr. Brown, and that the traffic stop was then unlawfully extended. To the extent that the
district court found that the reason for the stop was over at the time the officer returned
to make contact Mr. Brown, the court's findings were, in essence, based on the totality
of the facts presented at the suppression hearing, particularly the testimony of the
officer and the contents of the video of the traffic stop.

Because the district court's

findings of fact and conclusions of law, when viewed in their totality, were in accord with
the evidence and with the correct legal standards, Mr. Brown submits that the Court of
Appeals erred when it reversed the district court.

Further, even though the Court of

Appeals was "unable to find any evidence in the record to support the [district court's]
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conclusion of law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer
returning to Brown's van," conversely, there was no evidence in the record to support
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the purpose of the stop was not over upon the
officer returning to Mr. Brown's van. (Opinion, p.6.)

B.

Standard For Granting Petitions For Review
The decision whether to grant a petition for review of an opinion from the Idaho

Court of Appeals pursuant to I.AR. 118 is discretionary with this Court. I.AR. 118(b).
When this Court grants a petition for review, this Court reviews directly the decision of
the trial court. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,470 (2010).

C.

This Court Should Grant Mr. Brown's Petition For Review, And Affirm The District
Court's Order Granting Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress The State's Evidence,
Because the District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress
The State's Evidence
As an initial matter, Mr. Brown asserts that this Court should grant his petition for

review because the Opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is probably not in
accord with prior decisions from this Court and from the Court of Appeals with regard to
the application of the proper standard of review for decisions by the trial court with
regard to motions to suppress. See I.AR. 118(b)(2), (3).
This Court applies a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress.

First, this Court defers to the district court's

findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous.

See, e.g., State v.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). This Court also gives deference to any implicit

findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

State v.

Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, this Court reviews de novo the trial
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court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.
Idaho at 485-486.

Willoughby, 147

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of

witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995).
In this case, the Court of Appeals examined the evidence in the record and found
that the officer "had not given Brown the warning regarding the rear window" before
asking Mr. Brown to exit the vehicle. (Opinion, p.6.) The Court of Appeals went on to
find that "[t]his Court is unable to find any evidence in the record to support the
conclusion of law that the purpose of the stop ended immediately upon the officer
returning to Brown's van." (Opinion, p.6.)
However, the point in time where the investigating officer ceased investigating
the plastic covered rear window is a finding of fact. See e.g., United States v. Shabazz,
993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that finding that "the period of detention by
the officers was not beyond the scope of the initial purpose for the stop" was a finding of
fact that was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous); United
States v. Hutchinson, 408 F.3d 796, 797 (O.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that finding of fact to

be determined by the district court included question of whether retention of defendant's
identification for the purpose of running the information through the computer was
related to the purpose of the stop). Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
district court's determination of when the purpose of the stop ended was a conclusion of
law. (Opinion, p.6.)
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but
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freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v.

Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). The standard of review upon which a
reviewing court examines a district court's order on a motion to suppress the State's
evidence looks to the totality of the court's findings and views all of the trial court's
findings within this context. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111-112 (2013);

State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498, 503-504 (Ct. App. 2000). In addition, appellate courts
will uphold any implied findings in support of the trial court's ruling where there is any
gap in the actual findings made by the trial court and where the evidence will support
those findings. See, e.g., State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 624-627 (1986); State v.

Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 314-316 (Ct. App. 1993). Under a review of the totality of the trial
court's order, it appears that the standard used by the Court of Appeals to examine the
trial court's findings is not supported by Idaho case law.
Thus, the Court of Appeals improperly disturbed the finding of fact by the trial
court as to when the purpose of the stop ended, as that finding was supported by
substantial evidence-the testimony of the investigating officer that he spoke to
Mr. Brown about the traffic violation before running his documentation through the
computer. (4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10) (emphasis added).
Decisions regarding the credibility of the evidence, as well as inferences from the
evidence, are solely within the province of the trial court. See, e.g., Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 810. Because the district court was empowered to make just such an inference from
the evidence, there was nothing improper in the district court relying on Officer Cwik's
testimony in order to find that the purpose of the stop was over after Officer Cwik
returned to make contact with Mr. Brown after running his information through the
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computer. At the suppression hearing, Officer Cwik testified as to the timeline of the
traffic stop:
Q: And what occurred after you stopped that vehicle?

A: I spoke with the driver about the traffic violation. I spoke with the driver
about the traffic violation, and then I went back to my car and I ran his
information through the MDC.
(4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10.) Further, Officer Cwik testified that he warned Mr. Brown
about the violation of the traffic code:
Q: Okay. Did you issue him a citation for the violation of some traffic code?

A: I did not. I gave him a warning.
(4/30/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25.)
The district court correctly held that the purpose of the traffic stop had ended
once Officer Cwik returned to Mr. Brown's vehicle and the stop was unlawfully extended
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Further, the burden was on the State to establish
that the seizure was limited in scope and duration in order to satisfy the conditions of an
investigative seizure under Florida v. Royer.
(Ct. App. 2009.).

State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8

The State did not meet its burden in this case.

The district court

concluded:
So this Court finds that by Officer Cwik maintaining and hanging onto the
driver's license and the necessary paperwork, registration and insurance,
of Mr. Brown beyond that which was necessary for his dealing with the
covered up window in the back, was an unlawful and illegal extension of
that detention, which makes ineffective the consent that Mr. Brown gave to
Officer Cwik.
(5/24/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.15-22.)
Here, the Court of Appeals did not limit its review to a finding of whether the trial
court correctly applied constitutional principles to the facts as found, instead the Court of

13

Appeals made a specific factual finding adverse to the findings by the district court-the
Court of Appeals found that the officer had not given Mr. Brown a warning regarding the
rear window; however, this fact was not supported by the evidence in the record.
In fact, there was an absolute absence of any evidence that Officer Cwik
intended to issue a written warning or return to the initial reason for the stop at any point
after he ran Mr. Brown's documents.
When asked if he issued Mr. Brown a citation for the violation of the traffic code,
Officer Cwik stated that he "gave him a warning." (4/30/12 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25.) The
record is not made clear whether the warning was verbal or written.

In its briefing,

respondent characterized the conversation between Officer Cwik and Mr. Brown as the
issuance of "a warning" based on the language that Officer Cwik used-that he told, i.e.,
warned, Mr. Brown that the plastic covered rear window was an equipment violation.

(See Respondent's Brief, p.12.) Officer Cwik did not testify that he made further inquiry
of Mr. Brown regarding the covered up rear window, nor did he testify that he wrote out
a written warning, thus it appears that by speaking with Mr. Brown about the traffic
violation, Officer Cwik verbally warned Mr. Brown about the potential equipment
violation at the outset of the stop. Further, there is no indication from the record, and
the district court did not find, that Officer Cwik revisited (or intended to revisit) the issue
after running Mr. Brown's information through his computer. Even if this discussion did
not constitute the "warning" anticipated upon by the Court of Appeals, nonetheless,
there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Officer Cwik intended to issue a
written warning.

Further, the evidence was uncontroverted that the discussion of the
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plastic covered rear window had ceased by the time Officer Cwik asked Mr. Brown for
his driver's license and registration.
Within this appeal, the State raised no challenge to any of the district court's
factual findings. As such, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the facts as
found by the district court, the district court erred in granting Mr. Brown's motion to
suppress the State's evidence.

Mr. Brown submits that the district court's ruling

granting his motion to suppress was amply supported both by the evidence and by
governing case law, and that this Court should therefore affirm the district court.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 486 (2009).

The protections of the Fourth Amendment have been

incorporated to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. at 811. In addition,
even brief detentions of individuals must meet with the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness.

Id.

This means that the detention must be both

justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
originally justified the interference in the first place. Id.
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable,
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed,
or is about to commit, a crime. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, the officer must be
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able to point to specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires
more than a mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion."

Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). Whether an

officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention.
Id.

Moreover, the "scope of the detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying

justification," and the investigative detention cannot last any longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
These same standards apply where the detention at issue is a traffic stop. See,
e.g., State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct.App. 2005). "The question whether an

investigative detention is reasonable requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it is reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."

Id.

While the

purpose of a stop is not inevitably fixed at the point of the initiation of the traffic stop,
and may evolve based upon additional information coming to light, any extension of the
detention must be carefully tailored to the underlying justification of the stop. Id. at 562563.
Mr. Brown submits that the district court's order granting his motion to suppress
was based on ample evidence found in the record and followed the correct legal
standards, and therefore the district court did not err in finding that the reason for the
stop was over when Officer Cwik returned to Mr. Brown's vehicle after running
Mr. Brown's license and registration in the computer.

16

In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals likened this case to that of State v. Silva, 134
Idaho 848 (Ct. App. 2000), and found, "Like in Silva, the fact that the officer could have
issued the warning immediately upon returning to Brown's van is not dispositive."
(Opinion, p.6.)

However, testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress was

clear-the investigating officer testified that he "spoke to" Mr. Brown about the traffic
violation before obtaining Mr. Brown's information and running it through the computer.
(4/30/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-9.) He later testified that he gave "a warning" to Mr. Brown.
(4/30/12 Tr., p.27, L.25.) No evidence or testimony was introduced which indicated that
the investigating officer continued his investigation into the traffic violation after asking
Mr. Brown to step out of the vehicle. No evidence or testimony was introduced which
indicated that the officer intended to speak to Mr. Brown further about the traffic
violation after asking Mr. Brown to step out of the vehicle, and no evidence was
introduced which indicated that the officer intended to give Mr. Brown a written warning.
It appears that the district court impliedly found that the investigating officer
meant that when he spoke to Mr. Brown about the traffic violation he was "warning"
Mr. Brown about the traffic violation, and no evidence or testimony or argument was
made to the contrary. The Court of Appeals' Opinion is erroneous because it is based
on a presumption by the Court of Appeals-that the investigating officer was planning to
talk to Mr. Brown again about the plastic over the window and possibly issue him a
written warning. For the Court of Appeals to reverse the order of the district court based
on facts which are not in the record, is a clear departure from established precedent and
the parameters of its standard of review.
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The district court found the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Gutierrez,
137 Idaho 647 (Ct. App. 2002), instructive in that an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. "An
individual may not be detained, even momentarily, without reasonable objective
grounds for so doing. A consent to search given during an illegal detention is tainted by
the illegality and therefore is an ineffective consent." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).
As was found on by the district court, Officer Cwik's actions in this case are
analogous to those found to have unlawfully extended the traffic stop in Gutierrez. See
Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647.

In Gutierrez, the driver was stopped for speeding.

The

officer collected the driver's license and registration and returned to his patrol car. After
checking the information, the officer returned to the vehicle and had the driver exit the
vehicle. The officer then issued the driver a warning citation and returned the license
and registration.

Without indicating the driver was free to leave or turning off the

overhead lights, the officer then asked three questions unrelated to the traffic stop that
carried an accusatory tenor.
seconds.

These questions took approximately sixty to ninety

The officer explained that he continued the investigation because a

passenger appeared nervous. The officer then requested and received permission to
search the vehicle.

The search led to the discovery of marijuana and drug

paraphernalia. Id. at 649.
In holding that the officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop, the Idaho Court of
Appeals explained that the "original purpose for the detention of [the driver] and his
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passengers was to issue a warning or citation for speeding and that purpose was
accomplished when [the officer] issued the warning." Id. at 652.
Here, the purpose of the stop-to talk to the driver as to the legality of the plastic
covered rear window-was over after Officer Cwik finished discussing the window with
Mr. Brown.

The stop was permissibly extended to allow Officer Cwik to verify that

Mr. Brown was a licensed driver and the vehicle was properly registered. 6 However, the
district court correctly found that the purpose of the stop was over at the point when
Officer Cwik returned to the vehicle.
Accordingly, the district court correctly ruled that the reason for the traffic stopthe plastic covered rear window-was over at the time that Officer Cwik returned to
contact with Mr. Brown, and that Officer Cwik then unlawfully extended the duration of
this stop in order to request consent to search. The district court found that the traffic
stop was extended for no articulable reason other than for the officer to ask for consent
to search the vehicle. The district court found that because Officer Cwik kept a hold of
the driver's license and registration and insurance, beyond what was necessary for
dealing with the covered up window in the back, such constituted an unlawful and illegal
extension of Mr. Brown's detention, which rendered ineffective the consent Mr. Brown
gave to Officer Cwik.

The court's order was well-reasoned and was rooted in an

examination of the totality of the circumstances - including Officer Cwik's testimony
relating to the purpose of the traffic stop as well as the officer's testimony as to the
timeline of events during the stop. (5/25/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-10, p.7, Ls.17-24.) This is

6

This Court has held that once a legitimate traffic stop has occurred, "nothing in the
Fourth Amendment ... preclude[sJ the officer from routinely asking the motorist to
exhibit his driver's license, the vehicle registration and an insurance certificate." State v.
Reed, 107 Idaho 162, 165 (Ct. App. 1984).
19

precisely the examination that is required under the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1996).

Although the State asserted that further detention of Mr. Brown was justified as
Officer Cwik had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the investigation, such a
claim was not argued to the trial court and was raised for the first time on appeal.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10; Appellant's Reply Brief, pp.5-6.)

It is well-settled that

"Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for appeal through an
objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010).
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that, "an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. In this case, the actions of Officer Cwik, from the time of his

initial contact with Mr. Brown, objectively demonstrate that the officer extended the stop
well beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop for the
plastic covered rear window. Because of this, the district court did not err in granting
Mr. Brown's motion to dismiss on the basis that his detention was unlawfully extended
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court
of Appeals because the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that there was no
evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that the purpose of the
stop ended immediately upon the officer returning to Mr. Brown's van. The Court found
that the purpose of the stop had not been completed when the officer asked Mr. Brown
to step out of his vehicle.

However, this conclusion runs contrary to the trial court's

finding, and appears to be based on nothing more than mere speculation. There was no
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testimony or evidence before either the trial court or the Court of Appeals that indicated
that the investigating officer intended to further "warn" Mr. Brown about his broken
window after he asked consent to search the vehicle. Mr. Brown respectfully requests
that this Court grant review and affirm the decision of the district court.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court grant his petition for review and
affirm the district court's order granting his motion to suppress the evidence.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2014.

SALLYr.
Y
.
Deputy State Appella~ublic Defender
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